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Abstract
We reconsider the class of weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of
Dubra (2001), and using methods of Imai (1983), extend their character-
ization to the domain of multilateral bargaining problems. Aside from
standard axioms in the literature, this result involves a new property that
weakens the axiom Bilateral Consistency (Lensberg, 1988), by making the
notion of consistency dependent on how ideal values in a reduced problem
change relative to the original problem.
JEL-Classification: C78, D60, D70
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1 Introduction
In this article we adopt the view that bargaining problems (Nash, 1950) reflect
actual negotiations, and that bargaining solutions encapsulate all the strategic
interactions that take place between negotiating agents. We further adopt Luce
and Raiffa’s (1957) view that the aspiration levels these agents hold – summa-
rized in their ideal values – make up an important determining factor for the
outcome they ultimately agree on.
Following Harsanyi (1959), Lensberg (1988) introduced an axiom named
Bilateral Consistency (BCON),1 which states that if an agent accepts a certain
∗University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School, G12 8QQ Glasgow, UK. Telephone:
+44 141 330 5508. Email address: driesen.bram@gmail.com.
1Lensberg calls this axiom Bilateral Stability.
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outcome, then he also accepts it in any two-person reduced problem that involves
him.
Example. Consider three players – 1, 2 and 3 – facing the problem S,
as depicted in Figure 1, and suppose the compromise they reach is given by
y := (α, α, α) for some α > 0. Suppose next that agent 1 leaves the negotiations
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Figure 1: The problems S and T .
with his payoff y1 = α, and agents 2 and 3 are left to renegotiate their outcome
(i.e., face reduced problem T ). The axiom BCON states that they reach the
same mutual agreement in T as they did in S. ‖
Thomson and Lensberg (1989, p. 100) motivate BCON as follows: “[A] rational
agent i will not accept a tentative agreement for the bargaining problem [S] if
he has reason to believe that he could successfully force or convince some other
agent j to make a concession in his favor. If simultaneous challenges against
more than one agent are not permitted, then i can base his beliefs about j’s
willingness to concede only on principles that would guide them in solving two-
person problems involving just the two of them.”
The underlying assumption is that the situation i faces in the two-person
problem is comparable to the situation he faces in S. However, if a solution
is meant to reflect the outcome of actual negotiations, and ideal points are
pertinent to the outcomes they lead to, this assumption may not always hold.
As the above example shows, the ideal values of two agents – and therefore also
their bargaining attitudes with respect to one another – may be very different
in the two-person reduced problem than in the original situation. As a result,
what agent i can get from j in the reduced problem may not accurately reflect
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j’s willingness to concede in S. For instance, in the above example, agent 2’s
position with respect to agent 3 is weaker in T than in S; then a concession in
his favor in T may not be enough for agent 3 to exclude y as a possible solution
outcome of S. On the other hand, if the operation of problem reduction reduces
both agents’ ideal values in the same proportion, then their relative positions
with respect to one another remain unchanged. What an agent j would then be
willing to concede to i in this reduced problem, is representative of what he is
willing to concede in the original situation.2 Hence, agent i can form accurate
beliefs about what j is entitled to in S, and will reject the tentative agreement
if he believes it gives j too much. We propose an axiom, named Conditional
Consistency (CCON), that captures exactly this idea: it imposes BCON under
the condition that the two agents’ ideal values in the reduced problem change
proportionally with respect to the original problem.
A further implication of our interpretation of the bargaining problem con-
cerns Anonymity (AN). The fact that a problem is the summation of an actual
negotiation, is in line with the Nash program for bargaining; several results in
this literature reveal that asymmetric solutions may arise quite naturally from
asymmetries in the underlying bargaining protocol (see e.g. Laruelle and Va-
lenciano (2008), Britz et al. (2010), and Anbarci and Sun (2013)).3 As such,
Anonymity may be too strong a requirement, and we do not impose it.
Our main result is that CCON, combined with several standard (and uncon-
troversial) properties, characterizes a class of weighted lexicographic extensions
of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Imai, 1983; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975).
The Kalai-Smorodinsky – or KS – solution is known to be inefficient in a large
class of problems (Roth, 1979); Imai’s lexicographic maxmin – or leximin – so-
lution is a lexicographic version of the KS solution that yields efficient outcomes
on the full domain. Dubra (2001) defined and characterized a class of weighted
lexicographic KS solutions on the specific domain of two-person problems. The
family of solutions considered in this paper, and the associated characterization,
may be seen as multilateral generalizations of Dubra’s results.
This paper fits into the broader literature on lexicographic solutions. Exam-
ples of this literature, aside from other work on the (symmetric) lexicographic
KS solution (Chang and Liang, 1998; Driesen, 2012), include lexicographic ver-
sions of the egalitarian solution (Chun and Peters, 1989; Thomson and Lensberg,
2This claim is more carefully motivated in Section 2.3.1.
3These papers provide non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash solution (Nash,
1950; Harsanyi and Selten, 1972; Kalai, 1977a).
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1989; Nieto, 1992; Chang and Hwang, 1999; Chen, 2000) and the equal-loss
solution (Chun, 1989; Chun and Peters, 1991). For problems with claims, lex-
icographic extensions of the proportional solution (Chun and Thomson, 1992)
and the extended claims-egalitarian solution (Bossert, 1993) were studied by del
Carmen Marco Gil (1995).
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces relevant definitions and
notations. Section 3 contains the main result, a characterization of the family
of weighted lexicographic KS solutions described above, and Section 4 discusses
the independence of the axioms. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Bargaining Problem
There is an infinite, countable population of agents, indexed by the set of natural
numbers N. The collection of all non-empty, finite subsets N of N, is denoted
N . For each N ∈ N , let |N | be the number of agents contained in N , and let
RN be the Cartesian product of |N | copies of R, indexed by the members of
N . Denoting the zero vector as 0¯, the positive and strictly positive orthant are
given by RN+ := {x ∈ RN | x = 0¯} and RN++ := {x ∈ RN | x > 0¯}.4
Given N ∈ N , a bargaining problem – in short, a problem – is defined by a
subset S of RN , that is non-empty, closed, convex and comprehensive (i.e., for
all x, y ∈ RN , if x ∈ S and x = y, then y ∈ S), contains a point z > 0¯, and is
further such that S ∩ RN+ is bounded.
The interpretation is as follows. An outcome or point x ∈ RN represents a
payoff profile for the agents in N , in the sense that each xi, i ∈ N , specifies the
utility realized by player i. The feasible set S represents all outcomes attainable
by the players in N . The outcome 0¯ – the disagreement point – is the outcome
that obtains if agents fail to find a compromise. Note that normalizing this
point to 0¯ is without loss of generality. The condition that the feasible set holds
outcomes that strictly dominate the disagreement point, represents the notion
that all participating agents have some stake in the negotiations.
For each N ∈ N , let ΣN be the family of all problems for N , and let
Σ :=
⋃
N∈N Σ
N be the family of all such problems. A bargaining solution – in
short, a solution – is a real-valued function ϕ defined on Σ, that assigns for each
N ∈ N , and to each S ∈ ΣN , a single outcome ϕ(S) in S. This outcome, also
4Vector inequalities: =, ≥, >.
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called the solution outcome, represents the agreement the agents in N reach in
the problem S.
2.2 Standard Axioms
This section restates a number of standard axioms for bargaining solutions. This
requires some additional notation.
Given N ∈ N , and given S ∈ ΣN , the set of Pareto-optimal points in S
is defined as P (S) := {x ∈ S | y ≥ x implies y /∈ S}. For x, y ∈ RN , xy is
a vector in RN with (xy)i := xiyi for all i ∈ N . If there is a real number
β such that yi = β for all i ∈ N , then xy is also denoted βx. Furthermore,
xS := {xy | y ∈ S}. Given a permutation pi of N , and a vector x ∈ RN ,
pi(x) is the vector in RN with (pi(x))i := xpi(i) for all i ∈ N . Furthermore,
pi(S) := {pi(x) | x ∈ S}. The ideal point of S is a vector u(S) in RN with
ui(S) := max{xi | x ∈ S ∩ RN+} for each i ∈ N . For Q ∈ N with Q ⊂ N , and
x ∈ RN , the vector y in RQ with yi = xi for all i ∈ Q, is denoted xQ.5 Then
S−i denotes the closure of the set {xN\{i} | x ∈ S and x 5 u(S)}. Finally, if
two points x, y ∈ RN are proportional – i.e., x = βy for some β > 0 – then we
write x ∝ y.
In our statement of the axioms, we omit the phrase ‘For all N ∈ N and
S ∈ ΣN ’.
Strong Individual Rationality (SIR). ϕ(S) > 0¯.
Pareto Optimality (PO). ϕ(S) ∈ P (S).
Homogeneity (HOM). For all real β = 0, ϕ(βS) = βϕ(S).
Scale Invariance (SI). For all a ∈ RN+ , ϕ(aS) = aϕ(S).
Anonymity (AN). For all permutations pi of N , ϕ(pi(S)) = pi(ϕ(S)).
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). For all T ∈ ΣN with
ϕ(S) ∈ T ⊆ S, ϕ(T ) = ϕ(S).
IIA other than Ideal Point (IIIA). For all T ∈ ΣN with ϕ(S) ∈ T ⊆ S
and u(T ) = u(S), ϕ(T ) = ϕ(S).
Restricted IIA (RIIA). For all T ∈ ΣN with ϕ(S) ∈ T ⊆ S and u(T ) ∝
u(S), ϕ(T ) = ϕ(S).
5Inclusion is denoted ⊆, and strict inclusion ⊂.
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Individual Monotonicity (IM). For all T ∈ ΣN with T ⊆ S and S−i = T−i
for some i ∈ N , ϕi(S) = ϕi(T ).
Roth (1977) introduced and discussed IIIA. Dubra (2001) introduced the weaker
axiom RIIA. The property IM was introduced by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975),
but the version presented here is due to Imai (1983). The other properties are
well known, and require no further elaboration.
2.3 Bilateral Consistency and Conditional Consistency
Lensberg (1988) introduced the axiom Bilateral Consistency, discussed in the
introduction. Given Q,N ∈ N with Q ⊂ N , and y ∈ S ∩RN+ , let myQ(S) be the
slice of S through y, parallel to RQ – i.e., myQ(S) := {x ∈ RQ | (x, yN\Q) ∈ S}.
Note that myQ(S) is a well-defined problem in Σ
Q. Then Bilateral Consistency
is as follows (again, stated for all N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN ).
Bilateral Consistency (BCON). If ϕ(S) = 0¯, then for all Q ⊂ N with
|Q| = 2 and for all T ∈ ΣQ with T := mϕ(S)Q (S), ϕ(T ) = (ϕ(S))Q.
We propose Conditional Consistency, an axiom that imposes BCON under the
added condition that the two considered agents’ ideal values change proportion-
ally.
Conditional Consistency (CCON). If ϕ(S) = 0¯, then for all Q ⊂ N with
|Q| = 2 and T ∈ ΣQ with T := mϕ(S)Q (S) and u(T ) ∝ (u(S))Q, ϕ(T ) =
(ϕ(S))Q.
The axiom CCON is weaker than BCON, and thus satisfied by solutions such
as the Nash solution (Nash, 1950), the proportional solutions (Kalai, 1977b),
and the lexicographic egalitarian solution (Thomson and Lensberg, 1989). It is
further satisfied by the KS solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975). The Raiffa
solution (Raiffa, 1953) violates CCON.6
Lensberg also introduced a stronger version of BCON, that does not restrict
consistency to two-person reduced problems.
6For N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN , the Nash solution (Nash, 1950) is defined as the unique
maximizer of
∏
i∈N xi on S ∩ RN+ . A proportional solution is defined as β∗w where w is
some vector in RN++, and β∗ := max{β | βw ∈ S}. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai
and Smorodinsky, 1975) is defined as K(S) := β∗u(S), where β∗ := max{β | βu(S) ∈ S}.
The Raiffa solution is defined as the (possibly infinite) sum 1|N|u(S) +
1
|N|u(S − 1|N|u(S)) +
1
|N|u(S − 1|N|u(S)− 1|N|u(S − 1|N|u(S))) + . . ..
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Figure 2: An illustration of CCON with Q = {2, 3} and N = {1, 2, 3}.
Multilateral Consistency (MCON). If ϕ(S) = 0¯, then for all non-empty
Q ⊂ N and T := mϕ(S)Q (S), ϕ(T ) = (ϕ(S))Q.
In similar fashion, we may also define a stronger version of CCON that applies
to multilateral or single-agent reduced problems. However, such a strengthening
of CCON turns out to be unnecessary for the purpose of this paper.
2.3.1 Discussion
Luce and Raiffa (1957) formulated the well-known criticism on Nash’s (1950) IIA
that it makes solutions too unresponsive to the geometry of the feasible set. The
specific aspect they focused on was the ideal point: since ideal values represent
the utilities agents may aspire to when engaging in the negotiations, they are
an important psychological component to the attitudes these agents hold, and
may therefore have an important influence on the outcome that is ultimately
agreed on. This is illustrated by the example below:7 whatever outcome agents
1 and 2 may ultimately agree on in problem A, if their ideal values matter in
these negotiations, it is plausible that agent 2 will settle for a lower payoff in
problem B.
The intuition that agent 2 will not be able to secure as high a payoff in
problem B as in A is not just driven by the fact that his own ideal point is
lower in the former than in the latter, but also by the fact that for agent 1 the
two problems are identical in this respect. The change in 2’s solution payoff
7See also Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 133).
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is not so much driven by the change in his ideal value per se, but rather by
the change in his ideal value relative to that of agent 1. To further illustrate
this point, consider the problems C and D below, and observe that while they
have different ideal points, agents’ relative ideal values in these problems are
the same. Suppose now that agents have come to some agreement in problem
C, and subsequently face the problem D. It is true that the ideal point then
changes, but since agents’ ideal values have decreased in the same proportion,
the ability of both agents to stake out higher claims is curtailed in exactly the
same way. Intuitively, there is then no obvious reason why this should lead
either agent to demand a higher payoff. Both agents would have to hold a more
timid attitude, but since their relative positions have not changed, it is not
unreasonable to assume that what they deem a “fair” compromise in problem C
remains a “fair” compromise in D. Note that this is exactly the reasoning that
underpins RIIA (Dubra, 2001).
Agent 2
Agent 1
b
1
1
(0.6, 0.4)
(a) Problem C
Agent 2
Agent 1
b
0.8
0.8
(0.6, 0.4)
(b) Problem D
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Let us now turn our attention to BCON and its motivation. To this end,
consider again the example given in the introduction. As agent 1 leaves the
negotiations with his solution payoff α, agents 2 and 3 are renegotiating their
payoffs (α, α) in the reduced problem T that results from agent 1’s departure.
The property BCON says that they should then realize the same payoffs (α, α) in
the reduced problem T as they did in the original problem S. The motivation for
this type of robustness against renegotiation lies in the idea that agents evaluate
the worth of tentative agreements on the basis of a particular thought exercise:
when confronted with the potential agreement y, an agent – say, agent 3 –
will consider the hypothetical renegotiation of that agreement with each of his
opponents. If any such renegotiation leads to a higher payoff than α, then agent
3 would conclude that he could do better than α, and that the corresponding
outcome y should thus be rejected. A feasible outcome x can only be sustained
as the solution outcome if no agent has a reason to oppose it on the basis of
such reasoning.
While BCON seems sensible, if we accept Luce and Raiffa’s argument that
ideal points matter for the outcomes negotiations lead to, it becomes problem-
atic. To see this, consider again the example from the introduction, and note
that in the reduced problem T , agent 3 has a higher ideal value relative to agent
2 than in S itself. This means that in T , agent 2 would have a relatively more
modest attitude towards agent 3 than in the original problem. Then does the-
orizing what he could get in T really help agent 3 in deciding whether y is a
good offer in S? Arguably, it does not. Acknowledging that agents’ ideal values
play an important role in the bargaining process leads to the recognition that
in problems S and T , agents 2 and 3 may stake out very different positions with
respect to one another. As a result, the fact that agent 3 can hypothetically
improve on the tentative agreement y by renegotiating it with agent 2, may not
say very much about whether he should find that proposal acceptable in the
current circumstance.
Consider next the example outlined in Figure 2, and note that the ideal
values of agents 2 and 3 in the reduced problem T are proportional to the cor-
responding ideal values in S. In this case, agents 2 and 3 do have a comparable
mutual position with respect to one another in the two problems, and the out-
come agent 3 could secure in T does tell him something about 2’s willingness to
concede in the original problem S. In particular, if agent 3 were able to secure
a higher payoff in T than he is realizing under the proposed outcome in S, it
would now serve as a clear indication that the concession agent 2 is making in
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S is too low. Agent 3 would then have a legitimate reason to oppose it. This
reasoning is captured in CCON: a feasible outcome x can only be sustained as
the solution outcome if no agent has a legitimate reason to oppose it.
It should be noted that the above discussion is only meant to motivate
CCON, and should not be read as a criticism on BCON. The argument that
BCON might be too strong a requirement hinges crucially on two assumptions
we have made: that bargaining problems represent actual negotiations, and that
in those negotiations, agents’ ideal values play a crucial role. It may however
be a perfectly acceptable property under other interpretations of the bargaining
problem or other assumptions on the psychology of the agents.
2.3.2 The Connection Between CCON and WRGP
Peters et al. (1994) introduced an axiom named the Weak Reduced-Game Prop-
erty (WRGP), that is reminiscent of CCON.8 Specifically, given Q,N ∈ N with
Q ⊂ N and |Q| = 2, S ∈ ΣN , and a point y ∈ S ∩ RN+ with yQ ∈ RQ++, they
define a reduced problem SyQ ∈ ΣQ as the homogeneous transformation of the
projection of S ∩ RN+ onto RQ, that is such that the projection of y onto RQ is
contained in its boundary. More specifically, given y ∈ S ∩RN+ with yQ ∈ RQ++,
SyQ := βSQ
where
SQ := {x ∈ RQ | x 5 zQ for some z ∈ S ∩ RN+}
and
β := min{β′ | yQ ∈ β′SQ}.
Then the axiom is as follows (for all N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN ).
Weak Reduced-Game Property (WRGP). For Q ∈ N with Q ⊂ N and
|Q| = 2, if (ϕ(S))Q > 0¯ then ϕ(Sϕ(S)Q ) = (ϕ(S))Q.
The difference between WRGP and CCON lies in the definition of reduced
problems. In the axiom of Peters et al., the reduced problem SyQ is based on the
projection of the individually rational part of S (and that of the point y) onto
the subspace RQ. In our axiom the reduced problem myQ(S) is the slice of S,
through the point y and parallel to RQ. The distinction is important: CCON
does not imply WRGP, or vice versa.
8Peters et al. refer to reduced problems as reduced games.
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To see that CCON does not imply WRGP, consider the Nash solution. Lens-
berg (1988) showed that it satisfies BCON; it therefore also satisfies CCON. To
see that it violates WRGP, consider the following example.9
S
y
Q
Agent 3
S
b
N(S) = y
1
1
1
b
N(
S
y
Q
)
b
yQ
Agent 1
Agent 2
Figure 3: The Nash solution violates WRGP.
Example. ConsiderN := {1, 2, 3} and S ∈ ΣN with S := cch{(1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1)},
and note that N(S) = (0.5, 1, 0.5). Let y := N(S) and note that for Q := {1, 2},
SyQ = cch{(1, 1)}. Then N(SyQ) = (1, 1) 6= (0.5, 1) = yQ, a violation of WRGP. ‖
To see that WRGP does not imply CCON, consider a solution F that for
all N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN yields K(S) whenever |N | < 3, and 12K(S) otherwise.
Observation 2.1 F satisfies WRGP.
Proof. Let S ∈ ΣN with |N | = 3, and without loss of generality, assume
ui(S) = uj(S) for all i, j ∈ N . The KS solution outcome is then the maximal
point in S with all entries equal. Therefore, y := F (S) is a point in RN with all
entries equal. Take any Q ⊂ N with |Q| = 2. By definition of the reduced prob-
lem SyQ, yQ is the maximal point in S
y
Q with both entries equal. Furthermore,
ui(S
y
Q) = uj(S
y
Q) for i, j ∈ Q. It follows that F (SyQ) = K(SyQ) = yQ.
The following example shows that F violates CCON.
9Given N ∈ N and V ⊂ RN , cch V denotes the convex comprehensive hull of (the points
in) V . It is defined as the intersection of all convex and comprehensive sets in RN that contain
(the points in) V .
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Example. LetN := {1, 2, 3} and S ∈ ΣN with S := cch{(6, 0, 0), (0, 6, 0), (0, 0, 6)},
and note that F (S) = (1, 1, 1). Let y := F (S) and Q := {1, 2}, and observe that
T := myQ(S) = cch{(4, 0), (0, 4)}. Then F (T ) = (2, 2) 6= (1, 1) = yQ, a violation
of CCON. ‖
2.4 A Family of Weighted Lexicographic KS Solutions
To formally define our solutions of interest, it is useful to first introduce the
‘lexicographic maxmin ordering’.
Definition. Given N ∈ N and x ∈ RN , let N¯ := {1, . . . , |N |}, and let µ(x) be
the vector in RN¯ , that is obtained by relabeling the coordinates of x such that
µ1(x) 5 . . . 5 µ|N |(x). The lexicographic maxmin ordering for N , denoted N ,
is defined as follows: For x, y ∈ RN , x N y if and only if there is a j ∈ N¯ such
that µj(x) > µj(y), and µi(x) = µi(y) for all i ∈ N¯ with i < j. Furthermore,
x ∼N y if and only if x = y. Let := {N | N ∈ N}.
It is further useful to introduce the lexicographic egalitarian solution (Thom-
son and Lensberg, 1989). It is a well-defined solution by Lemmas 3 and 4 of
Imai (1983, p. 395).
Definition. For S ∈ Σ, the lexicographic egalitarian solution ξ is defined as
the unique maximum in S with respect to . That is, ξ(S) := {y ∈ S | y 
x for all x ∈ S}.
Definition. For x ∈ RN++, define x−1 := (1/xi)i∈N . Then, given w ∈ RN++,
N ∈ N , and S ∈ ΣN , the weighted lexicographic KS solution Lw is defined as
Lw(S) := bξ(b−1S), (1)
where b = wNu(S). The family of all such solutions is denoted by L, i.e.,
L := {Lw | w ∈ RN++}.
Consider N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN with ui(S) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Given w ∈ RN++,
Lw(S) is obtained by the following procedure. Starting from the disagreement
point 0¯, increase the utilities of all the agents in N(≡ Q1) simultaneously in the
direction wQ1 , until the boundary of S is reached, say in the point x
1. There is a
number of agents for whom a further improvement would result in an infeasible
alternative. Fix the payoffs of these agents at their x1-levels, and continue
12
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Figure 4: An illustration of Lw (with w1 > w2 > w3).
increasing the utilities of the remaining agents (call this set of remaining agents
Q2) in the direction wQ2 . This leads again to a point – say x
2 – from which
further increase of utilities means stepping out of S. Since the total number of
agents in N is finite, and since at each iteration at least one is excluded from
further improvement, this procedure terminates in a finite number of steps. The
resulting outcome corresponds with Lw(S).
The lexicographic KS solution L (Imai, 1983) is the unique symmetric solu-
tion in L.
Theorem 2.2 (Imai, 1983) A solution ϕ satisfies PO, SI, AN, IM and IIIA,
if and only if ϕ = L.
Dubra (2001) defined a class K of weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, for
the specific domain of two-person problems (i.e., problems for N with |N | = 2).
Except for the two corner solutions where one player’s weight is zero, the class
of solutions L is a multilateral generalization of K.
Theorem 2.3 (Dubra, 2001) A solution ϕ :
⋃
N∈N :|N |=2 →
⋃
N∈N :|N |=2RN
satisfies PO, SI, IM and RIIA if and only if ϕ ∈ K.
3 Main Result
The aim of this section is to obtain a characterization result for the above-defined
solution class.
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Theorem 3.1 A solution ϕ satisfies SIR, PO, SI, IM, IIIA and CCON if and
only if ϕ ∈ L.
Note the connection with the previously mentioned results. Imai’s (1983) axiom
set does not include SIR, since it is implied by the combination of PO, AN, IM,
and IIIA. Dubra’s (2001) axiom set contains RIIA, rather than IIIA. If the set
of agents exceeds two – as is the case in our framework – then RIIA is implied
by the other axioms of Theorem 3.1. Theorem 2.3 does not involve SIR. Aside
from the restriction to two-player problems, K is somewhat broader than L. In
particular, it allows for a specific type of lexicographic dictatorial solution.10
We first prove that solutions ϕ ∈ L satisfy the properties of Theorem 3.1.
To this end, the following Lemma is useful.
Lemma 3.2 The lexicographic egalitarian solution satisfies SIR, PO, IIA, HOM
and BCON.
Proof. It is obvious from its definition that the lexicographic egalitarian
solution satisfies SIR, PO, IIA, and HOM. Proposition 9.1 of Thomson and
Lensberg (1989, p. 132–133) shows that it satisfies MCON, and therefore also
BCON.
Proposition 3.3 If ϕ ∈ L, then it satisfies SIR, PO, SI, IM, IIIA and CCON.
Proof. Consider Lw ∈ L. It follows directly from the definition that this
solution satisfies SI. It further follows from Lemma 3.2 that it satisfies SIR,
PO and IIIA. By the same reasoning as in Proposition 1 of Imai (1983, p.
397), it satisfies IM.11 To establish CCON, let N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN , and
assume that u(S) = w−1N , such that L
w(S) = ξ(S). This is without loss of
generality by SI. Let Q ⊂ N with |Q| = 2, let T := myQ(S) where y := ξ(S),
and assume u(T ) ∝ (u(S))Q. The latter means there exists a strictly positive
real number β such that u(T ) = βw−1Q . Then since ξ satisfies HOM and BCON,
Lw(T ) = βξ
(
1
βT
)
= ξ(T ) = yQ.
The next step is to demonstrate that solutions in L are the only solutions
satisfying the properties of Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 3.4 If ϕ satisfies SIR, PO, SI, IM, IIIA and CCON, then ϕ ∈ L.
10See the solution D, defined in Section 4.1.
11This proof is included in the Appendix.
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To establish this result, it must be demonstrated that for any solution ϕ ∈
Σ satisfying the axioms of Theorem 3.1, there exists, up to a multiplicative
constant, a unique weights vector w ∈ RN++ such that ϕ = Lw. More specifically,
fixing a set of players N ∈ N and a problem S ∈ ΣN , it must be shown that
there exists a weights vector w ∈ RN++ – unique up to its restriction to the
coordinates in N and a multiplicative constant – such that ϕ(S) = Lw(S). The
argument is similar to Proposition 2 of Imai (1983), and it is thus useful to
recall some of his notations.
• For N ∈ N , for x, y ∈ RN , let x · y denote the inner product ∑i∈N xiyi. For
p ∈ RN and β ∈ R, let H(p, β) := {x ∈ RN | p · x 5 β}.
• Given N ∈ N , let ei be the vector in RN for which entry i is 1, and all others
0. For non-empty Q ⊆ N , we write ∑i∈Q ei as e(Q).
• Given Q,N ∈ N with Q ⊆ N , a problem S ∈ ΣN is Q-symmetric if for any
permutation pi of N with pi(i) = i for all i ∈ N \Q, pi(S) = S.
• For N ∈ N , S ⊂ RN and y ∈ S, let Q(S, y) := {i ∈ N | y + εei ∈
S for some ε > 0}. For y ∈ S with Q(S, y) 6= ∅, define
z(S, y) := y + a(S, y) e(Q(S, y))
where
a(S, y) := max {a ∈ R | y + a e(Q(S, y)) ∈ S} .
For y ∈ S with Q(S, y) = ∅, a(S, y) := 0 and z(S, y) := y, by convention. For
S ∈ ΣN , let z0 := 0¯ and zj := z(S, zj−1) for j = 1. Let k be the smallest
integer such that zj = zj+1. Then for j = 1, . . . , k, define
Qj := Q(S, zj−1), and aj := a(S, zj−1).
The sequences {zj}kj=1, {Qj}kj=1 and {aj}kj=1 are referred to as the defining
sequences of ξ(S).
Imai further proved the following lemma.12
Lemma 3.5 (Imai, 1983) For N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN ,
i) and for defining sequence {zj}kj=1 of ξ(S), ξ(S) = zk;
12Parts i) and ii) of Lemma 3.5 respectively correspond with lemmas 3 and 8 of Imai (1983,
p. 395, 397).
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ii) and for T := S ∩ H(p, β) with p > 0¯ and β > 0 such that u(S) = u(T ),
S−i = T−i for all i ∈ N .
Before going into the details of the proof of Proposition 3.4, it is useful to
present the argument in a more informal manner. First, the relevant weights
vector – i.e., the vector wN ∈ RN++ – is determined. It is obtained as the solution
outcome of a generic problem S0 in ΣN .
b
Agent 1 Agent 2
Agent 3
11
1 S0
ϕ(S0) = wN
Figure 5: Weights are determined by the solution in a generic problem.
By SI, we may without loss of generality assume that the considered problem
S is normalized, in the sense that u(S) = e(N). Given the defining sequence
{zj}kj=1 of ξ(w−1N S), the sequence {xj}kj=0 is constructed, where x0 := wN , and
xj := wNz
j for each j = 1. By part i) of Lemma 3.5 and the definition of Lw,
it then follows that Lw(S) = xk. Hence, it is sufficient to show that ϕ(S) = xk.
As in Imai’s proof, this is established by induction. In particular, a set of
auxiliary problems is constructed for each j = 1, . . . , k, and it is subsequently
shown that xj is the common solution outcome of all stage-j auxiliary problems.
This implies that xk is the common solution outcome of the final-stage auxiliary
problems. The observation that xk is efficient in S is then sufficient to conclude
that ϕ(S) = xk, the desired result.
The main difference between the present argument and that of Imai, lies
in the induction step. By combining AN with (Q-)symmetry of the auxiliary
problems, Imai asserts that agents’ utilities are always updated in an egalitarian
direction. Since AN is not in the axiom set of Theorem 3.1, this approach is not
available to us. Instead we rely on the property CCON. Consider two-person
problems H and T as in Figure 6.
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Agent 2
Agent 1
1
1
T
b
φ(T )
Agent 2
Agent 1
1
1
b
φ(H)H
Figure 6: If ϕ(T ) < (1, 1), ϕ(T ) is proportional to ϕ(H).
Using the axioms of Theorem 3.1, we show that the solution outcomes of H
and T are proportional. More specifically, we show that if the solution outcome
of T is strictly dominated by the ideal point (1, 1), then it is proportional to
the solution outcome of H. The usefulness of this observation is illustrated in
Figure 7. The three-person problem S
1
is {1, 2}-symmetric, so CCON may be
applied whatever the solution outcome may be. Thus, by CCON and the above
reasoning, the solution payoffs of agents 1 and 2 must be proportional to their
initial weights (w1, w2), regardless of the exact position of the solution outcome.
b
Agent 3
S
1
ϕ(S
1
) 11
1
Agent 1 Agent 2
b
Agent 3
S
0
wN
11
1
Agent 1 Agent 2
Figure 7: If (ϕ1(S
1
), ϕ2(S
1
)) < (1, 1), it is proportional to (w1, w2).
Agents 1 and 2 were chosen without loss of generality; repeating this analysis
for any other pair, establishes that ϕ(S
1
) is proportional to wN . By PO, this
pins down the solution outcome of S
1
.
Lemma 3.6 Let ϕ satisfy the properties of Theorem 3.1. For N := {1, 2} and
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for H,T ∈ ΣN defined as
H := {x ∈ RN | x1 + x2 5 1}, and
T := {x ∈ RN | x1 + x2 5 1 and x 5 (β, β)}, (β > 1/2),
if ϕ(T ) < (β, β), then ϕ(H) = ϕ(T ).
Proof. If β = 1, then by SIR, ϕ(H) ∈ T ⊂ H. β = 1 further implies
u(T ) = u(H) = (1, 1). Then ϕ(H) = ϕ(T ) follows immediately from IIIA.
Thus, assume β < 1. We first prove the following result.
If ϕ(H) ∈ T , then ϕ(T ) = ϕ(H). (2)
Assume that ϕ(H) ∈ T , and define H˜ := {x ∈ RN | x1 +x2 5 1 and x 5 (1, 1)}.
By PO and a two-fold application of IM, ϕ(H˜) = ϕ(H). Let k ∈ N \N , define
Q := {1, 2, k}, and for x ∈ RQ, represent the utility of agent k by the third
coordinate (i.e., x = (x1, x2, xk)). Let H
′, T ′ ∈ ΣQ with
H ′ := cch {(1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} and
T ′ := cch {(β, 1− β, 1), (1− β, β, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)}.
Then H ′ is the convex comprehensive hull of all (x, 1) ∈ RQ with x ∈ H˜.
Similarly, T ′ is the convex comprehensive hull of all (x, 0), (y, 1) ∈ RQ with
x ∈ H˜ and y ∈ T . By PO and CCON, ϕ(H ′) = (ϕ(H˜), 1). Since ϕ(H˜) ∈ T ,
ϕ(H ′) ∈ T ′. Moreover, u(H ′) = u(T ′) = e(Q), so by IIIA, ϕ(T ′) = ϕ(H ′).
Then ϕ(T ) = ϕ(H˜) by CCON. This establishes (2).
Now assume ϕ(T ) < (β, β). If ϕ(H) 5 (β, β), then ϕ(H) ∈ T , which by
(2) implies ϕ(H) = ϕ(T ). Thus, assume there is an agent i ∈ N such that
ϕi(H) > β, and without loss of generality, say i = 2. Let γ := ϕ2(H), and
define
T¯ := {x ∈ RN | x1 + x2 5 1 and x 5 (γ, γ)}, and
Tˆ :=
β
γ
T¯ .
By similar reasoning as above, ϕ(T¯ ) = ϕ(H), that is, ϕ(T¯ ) = (1− γ, γ). By SI,
ϕ(Tˆ ) = (βγ (1 − γ), β). Observe that Tˆ−i = T−i for i = 1, 2 and Tˆ ⊂ T . Thus,
by a two-fold application of IM, ϕ(T ) = ϕ(Tˆ ) = (βγ (1 − γ), β). Then by PO,
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Agent 2
Agent 1
H˜
1
1
b
φ(H˜) = φ(H)
(a) The problem H˜
Agent 2
Agent 1
T
1
1
β
β
b
φ(H)
(d) The problem T
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent k
H
′
1
1
1
H˜
H˜
b
ϕ(H ′)
(b) The problem H ′
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent k
H˜
T
T
′
β
β
1
1
1
b
ϕ(T ′)
(c) The problem T ′
Figure 8: If ϕ(H) ∈ T , then ϕ(T ) = ϕ(H).
ϕ(T ) = (1− β, β), contradicting the initial assumption that ϕ(T ) < (β, β).
Consider again the problem S
1
, introduced above. It is clear that Lemma 3.6
only has bite whenever (ϕ1(S
1
), ϕ2(S
1
)) < (1, 1). Since ϕ(S
1
) is not known,
the possibility that this condition is violated cannot be excluded. Therefore, it
is necessary to approximate this solution outcome. In particular, we construct
intermediate problems for which the condition is satisfied, and show that the
solution outcomes of these problems converge to the desired outcome.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Let ϕ be a solution satisfying SIR, PO, SI,
IM, IIIA and CCON. Fix some N ∈ N , consider the problem S0 ∈ ΣN defined
as S0 := H(e(N), 1), and define wN := ϕ(S
0). By SIR and PO, wN > 0¯ and
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Agent 2
Agent 1
1
1
H
γ
γ
T¯
β
β
T
Tˆ = β
γ
T¯
b
φ(H) = φ(T¯ )
b
φ(T ) = φ(Tˆ )
b
φ(Tˆ )
Figure 9: If ϕ2(H) > β, then ϕ2(T ) = β.
∑
i∈N wi = 1.
Consider a problem S ∈ ΣN with u(S) = e(N) and S = S∩(e(N)−RN+ ). By
SIR, SI and IIIA, this choice is without loss of generality. Let {zj}kj=1, {Qj}kj=1
and {aj}kj=1 be the defining sequences of ξ(w−1N S). Then define {xj}kj=0 by
x0 := wN and x
j := wNz
j for each j = 1, . . . , k. Furthermore, define {αj}kj=1
by αj :=
∑
i∈N x
j for each j. By part i) of Lemma 3.5 and the definition of
Lw, it is sufficient to show ϕ(S) = xk. This is achieved by induction on a set of
auxiliary problems.
Let p1 := 0¯ and for j = 2, . . . , k, let pj := e(N \Qj). Then
S
j
:= H(e(N), αj) ∩
 j⋂
j′=1
H(pj
′
, pj
′ · xj′)
 ∩ (e(N)− RN+ ) j = 1, . . . , k;
Sj := S
j ∩H(pj+1, pj+1 · xj+1) j = 1, . . . , k − 1;
Sj := H(e(N), αj) ∩ S j = 1, . . . , k;
S′j := S
j ∩ S j = 1, . . . , k.
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These problems are exactly as in Proposition 2 of Imai. Consider the problem
S
j
. The set H(e(N), αj) = {x ∈ RN | e(N) · x 5 αj} is a halfspace, and
since αj =
∑
i∈N x
j
i = e(N) · xj , it has xj in its boundary. Furthermore, since
ξ(w−1N S) 5 w−1N , xj = wNξ(w−1N S) 5 e(N); therefore, xj is a Pareto optimal
point in the set H(e(N), αj)∩ (e(N)−RN+ ). Take some 1 5 j′ 5 j, and observe
that
H(pj
′
, pj
′ · xj) = {x ∈ RN | pj′ · x 5 pj′ · xj′}
= {x ∈ RN | e(N \Qj′) · x 5 e(N \Qj′) · xj′}
= {x ∈ RN |∑i∈N\Qj′ xi 5∑i∈N\Qj′ xj′i }.
It is a N \Qj′-symmetric half-space through the point xj′ that does not restrict
the utilities of agents in Qj
′
. Since Qj ⊆ Qj′ , it thus also leaves the utilities
of agents in Qj free. Furthermore, since xj
′
N\Qj′ = x
j
N\Qj′ , it has x
j in its
boundary. Thus, S
j
is a problem in ΣN that is Qj \ Qj−1-symmetric, Qj−1 \
Qj−2-symmetric, etc., and furthermore, such that xj ∈ P (Sj). The problem
Sj (with j = 1) is the intersection of Sj with a half-space that now puts a
restriction on the utilities of agents in Qj \Qj+1. The problems Sj and S′j are
clear. Further illustration of these auxiliary problems by means of an example,
can be found in the Appendix.
The following claim says that these auxiliary problems are all normalized in
the sense that their ideal points are equal to the unit vector. The argument is
similar to Imai’s, and thus relegated to the Appendix.
Claim 1 u(S
j
) = u(Sj) = u(Sj) = u(S′j) = e(N) for each j = 1, . . . , k.
Observe that ϕ(S0) = x0. Thus, assume ϕ(Sj−1) = xj−1. The aim is to show
that this implies ϕ(S
j
) = xj . To this end it is useful to define the class of
intermediate problems between Sj−1 and S
j
:
Definition. For α ∈ [αj−1, αj ], let Tα := Sj ∩H(e(N), α).
Note that for all α ∈ [αj−1, αj ], Tα is Qj-symmetric and u(Tα) = e(N).
Claim 2 If j > 1, then for all α ∈ [αj−1, αj ], (ϕ(Tα))N\Qj = xjN\Qj .
Proof. Since ϕ(Sj−1) = xj−1 by assumption, and xj−1N\Qj = x
j
N\Qj , the
claim is trivially true when α = αj−1. Thus, take α ∈ (αj−1, αj ]. Since
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H(e(N), αj−1) ⊂ H(e(N), α),
Sj−1 = Tα ∩H(e(N), αj−1).
By part ii) of Lemma 3.5 this implies Sj−1−i = T
α
−i for all i ∈ N . Hence, by
an |N |-fold application of IM, ϕ(Tα) = xj−1. By the definition, if for some x,
xj−1 5 x ∈ Sj , then xi = xj−1i for all i ∈ N \ Qj . Since xj−1 5 ϕ(Tα) ∈ S
j
and xj−1N\Qj = x
j
N\Qj , the claim follows.
Claim 3 There exists an α¯ ∈ (αj−1, αj ] such that
• (ϕ(Tα))Qj < xjQj for all α ∈ [αj−1, α¯);
• (ϕ(Tα))Qj 6< xjQj for all α ∈ [α¯, αj ].
Proof. Define h : [αj−1, αj ] → RQj as h(α) := (ϕ(Tα))Qj . By an |N |-fold
application of IM, PO, and part ii) of Lemma 3.5, h is continuous and mono-
tonically increasing. Furthermore, h(αj−1) = xj−1Qj and h(α
j) = (ϕ(S
j
))Qj .
• Since xj−1Qj < xjQj , continuity of h implies that there exists an α ∈
(αj−1, αj ] such that h(α) < xjQj .
• By PO, ϕ(Sj) ∈ P (Sj). Then either ϕ(Sj) = xj , or there exists an i ∈ N
– and thus by Claim 2, an i ∈ Qj – such that ϕi(Sj) > xji . Hence, there
exists an α ∈ (αj−1, αj ] such that h(α) 6< xjQj .
By continuity and monotonicity of h, these observations imply that α¯ := sup{α |
h(α) < xjQj} is well-defined, and α¯ ∈ (αj−1, αj ].
If |Qj | = 1, then Claim 2 is sufficient to conclude that ϕ(Sj) = xj , since ϕ
satisfies PO. Thus, assume |Qj | = 2. Take Q ⊆ Qj with |Q| = 2, and without
loss of generality, assume Q = {1, 2}. Furthermore, fix some α ∈ [αj−1, α¯).
Claim 4 Let y ∈ RQ with y := (ϕ(Tα))Q, and define problems H,T ∈ ΣQ by
H :=
1
w1 + w2
mwNQ (S
0) and T :=
1
y1 + y2
m
ϕ(Tα)
Q (T
α).
Then
H = {x ∈ RQ | x1 + x2 5 1}, and (3)
T = {x ∈ RQ | x1 + x2 5 1 and x 5 (β, β)}, (4)
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where β := 1/(y1 + y2).
Proof. Since
∑
i∈N wi = 1, w1 + w2 = 1−
∑
i∈N\Q wi. Hence,
mwNQ (S
0) = {x ∈ RQ | x1 + x2 5 1−
∑
i∈N\Q wi}
= {x ∈ RQ | x1 + x2 5 w1 + w2}
This establishes (3). To prove (4), note first that
Tα = H(e(N), α) ∩
 j⋂
j′=1
H(pj
′
, pj
′ · xj′)
 ∩ (e(N)− RN+ )
Since ϕ(Tα) ∈ P (Tα) ⊂ P (H(e(N), α)), ∑i∈N ϕi(Tα) = α. Thus, y1 + y2 =
α−∑i∈N\Q ϕi(Tα). Then similar to the above,
m
ϕ(Tα)
Q (H(e(N), α)) = {x ∈ RQ | x1 + x2 5 α−
∑
i∈N\Q ϕi(T
α)}
= {x ∈ RQ | x1 + x2 5 y1 + y2}.
Furthermore,
m
ϕ(Tα)
Q (e(N)− RN+ ) = {x ∈ RQ | (x, (ϕ(Tα))N\Q) 5 e(N)}
= {x ∈ RQ | x 5 (1, 1)}.
Finally, the set
⋂j
j′=1H(p
j′ , pj
′ ·xj′) does not restrict the utilities of the agents
in Q, and may thus be ignored. Combining these three observations, we obtain
m
ϕ(Tα)
Q (T
α) = {x ∈ RQ | x1 + x2 5 y1 + y2 and x 5 (1, 1)}.
This establishes (4).
Claim 5 Outcomes y and xjQ are proportional.
Proof. By SI and CCON,
ϕ(H) =
(
w1
w1 + w2
,
w2
w1 + w2
)
and ϕ(T ) =
(
y1
y1 + y2
,
y2
y1 + y2
)
.
Moreover, by the choice of α, y < xjQ 5 (1, 1), and thus ϕ(T ) < (β, β). Then
by Claim 4 and Lemma 3.6, ϕ(T ) = ϕ(H). Since xjQj = a
jwQj , this implies
y1/y2 = w1/w2 = x
j
1/x
j
2, as desired.
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Claim 6 ϕ(S
j
) = xj.
Proof. We may repeat Claims 4 and 5 for all pairs of agents in Qj . This
leads to the conclusion that (ϕ(Tα))Qj and x
j
Qj are proportional. By continuity
of h, this implies that there exists a γ > 0 such that
h(α¯) = lim
α→α¯h(α) = γx
j
Qj .
By definition of α¯, γxjQj 6< xjQj . Hence, there must be an i ∈ Qj such that
γxji = x
j
i . Since x
j
i > 0, this implies γ = 1. Thus, assume γ > 1. Since then
h(α¯) > xjQj , it follows by continuity of h that there exists an α < α¯ such that
h(α) > xjQj . This contradicts the definition of α¯. Thus, γ = 1.
Hence, h(α¯) = xjQj . Since α
j = α¯, this implies h(αj) = xjQj . Then by Claim
2, ϕ(S
j
) = xj . Since xj ∈ P (Sj), this implies ϕ(Sj) = xj .
The rest of the proof is similar to Proposition 2 of Imai, and thus relegated to
the Appendix.
Remark. Without CCON, the axioms of Dubra (2001) (i.e., Theorem 2.3)
do not characterize a family of single-valued solutions. They pin down the first
iteration of the lexicographic optimization procedure, but have no bite when
this procedure does not terminate in one step. For instance, they admit for
any solution Fw, w ∈ RN++, of the following type: for N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN ,
Fw picks a unique outcome from the set P (S) ∩ {x | x = α∗wNu(S)}, where
α∗ = max{α ∈ R | αwNu(S) ∈ S}.
Further weakening RIIA to IIIA admits solutions, akin to lexicographic
monotone path solutions (Chun and Peters, 1989). Let Λ be the class of all
continuous, strictly increasing functions λ : [0, 1] → RN+ with λi(0) = 0 and
λi(1) = 1 for all i ∈ N. Then for N ∈ N , S ∈ ΣN and λ ∈ Λ, a solution Gλ is ad-
mitted that picks a unique outcome from the set P (S)∩{x | x = (λ(α∗))Nu(S)},
where α∗ = max{α ∈ [0, 1] | (λ(α))Nu(S) ∈ S}. Adding AN, we obtain the ax-
iom set of Imai (i.e., Theorem 2.2), and thus the lexicographic KS solution
L. ‖
4 Independence of the Axioms
The purpose of this Section is to investigate the independence of the axioms of
Theorem 3.1.
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4.1 Strong Individual Rationality
To show that SIR is not implied by the other axioms of Theorem 3.1, consider
the following solution.
Definition. For N ∈ N and x, y ∈ RN , x ∗ y if and only if there is a
j ∈ N such that xj > yj and xi = yi for all i ∈ N with i < j. Furthermore,
x ∼∗ y if and only if x = y. For S ∈ ΣN define D(S) as the outcome that
picks the unique maximum from S ∩ RN+ with respect to the ordering ∗, i.e.,
D(S) := {y ∈ S ∩ RN+ | y ∗ x for all x ∈ S ∩ RN+}.
It is immediately clear that D violates SIR. For instance, if N := {1, 2} and
S := cch{e1, e2}, then D(S) = (1, 0). We next show that D satisfies all other
axioms of Theorem 3.1.
Observation 4.1 D satisfies PO, SI, IM, IIIA, and CCON.
Proof. Consider N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN , and define y := D(S). To see that D
satisfies PO, assume y /∈ P (S). Then there is an i ∈ N and a z ∈ S ∩ RN+ such
that zj = yj for all j ∈ N \ i, and zi > yi. But then z ∗ y, in contradiction
with the definition of D.
To see that D satisfies IM, let T ∈ ΣN with T ⊆ S and T−i = S−i for some
i ∈ N . By Lemma A.1, Q(T, y) = Q(S, y) for any y ∈ T with i ∈ Q(T, y).
Hence, Di(S) = Di(T ).
To see that D satisfies IIIA, let T ∈ ΣN such that y ∈ T ⊆ S. Since y ∗ x
for all x ∈ S ∩RN+ and T ⊆ S, also y ∗ x for all x ∈ T ∩RN+ . Since y ∈ T ∩RN+
and y ∗ x for all x ∈ T ∩RN+ , D(T ) = y. Hence, D satisfies IIA, and thus also
IIIA.
To see that D satisfies CCON, we prove that D satisfies MCON. Assume
|N | = 3, and let Q ∈ N with Q ⊂ N . Without loss of generality, assume
Q := {1, 2, . . . , k}. Define T := myQ(S) and z := D(T ). Since y ∗ (z, yN\Q),
we must have y1 = z1. Suppose that y1 > z1. Since yQ ∈ T , this would imply
yQ ∗ z, contradicting z = D(T ). Hence, z1 = y1. Let k′ ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and
suppose zk′′ = yk′′ for all k
′′ 5 k′. Then y ∗ (z, yN\Q) implies yk′+1 = zk′+1.
However, if yk′+1 > zk′+1, then yQ ∗ z, contradicting z = D(T ). Hence,
z = yQ, that is, D satisfies MCON.
Finally, to see that D satisfies SI, consider v, w ∈ RN , and assume that
v ∗ w. Then there is a j ∈ N such that vj > wj , and vi = wi for all i ∈ N
with i < j. Then for a ∈ RN++, also ajvj > ajwj and aivi = aiwi for i ∈ N with
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i < j. In other words, av ∗ aw. Hence, for S ∈ ΣN , a point v is maximal in
S∩RN+ with respect to the ordering ∗, if and only if av is maximal in a(S∩RN+ )
with respect to ∗. Since a(S ∩ RN+ ) = aS ∩ RN+ , this implies D(aS) = aD(S).
Consider next an a ∈ RN+ , and let Q ⊂ N be the set of agents i ∈ N for
whom ai > 0. Since the utilities of agents in N \Q cannot be increased within
aS ∩ RN+ from their zero level, (D(aS))N\Q = aN\QyN\Q = 0¯N\Q. Define T :=
myQ(S), and observe that D(T ) = yQ by MCON. Furthermore, observe that
aT = mayQ (aS). Since (D(aS))N\Q = (ay)N\Q, this implies aT = m
D(aS)
Q (aS),
and thus, since D satisfies MCON, D(aT ) = (D(aS))Q. Then by the above,
(D(aS))Q = D(aT ) = aD(T ) = ayQ. In conclusion, D(aS) = aD(S).
4.2 Pareto Optimality
Roth (1979) showed that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K violates PO. On
the other hand, it is immediate that K satisfies SIR and SI. K further satisfies
IM, IIIA, and CCON.
Observation 4.2 K satisfies IM, IIIA, and CCON.
Proof. Let N ∈ N and S ∈ ΣN , and let β∗ be such that K(S) = β∗u(S).
To see that K satisfies IM, consider T ⊆ S with T−i = S−i for some i ∈ N ,
and define βˆ := max{β | βu(T ) ∈ S}. Since uj(T ) = uj(S) for all j ∈ N \ i
and ui(T ) 5 ui(S), βˆ = β∗, and thus βˆuj(T ) = Kj(S) for all j ∈ N \ i. Since
βˆu(T ) and K(S) are weakly Pareto optimal in S, βˆui(T ) 5 Ki(S). Finally,
since T ⊆ S, K(T ) 5 βˆu(T ). Hence, Ki(T ) 5 Ki(S).
To see that K satisfies IIIA, consider T ∈ ΣN with K(S) ∈ T ⊆ S and
u(T ) = u(S). Then K(T ) = βu(S) for some β. If β < β∗, then K(S) /∈ T , and
if β > β∗, then T 6⊆ S. Hence, β = β∗.
To see that K satisfies CCON, let |N | = 3, and assume without loss of
generality that u(S) = e(N); then K(S) is the maximal feasible point in egal-
itarian direction. Let Q ⊂ N with |Q| = 2, let T ∈ ΣQ with T := myQ(S) and
y := K(S), and assume that u(T ) ∝ (u(S))Q. Note that yQ is the maximal
point in T that lies in egalitarian direction. Since u(T ) ∝ (u(S))Q, this implies
yQ = K(T ).
4.3 Scale Invariance
Consider the lexicographic egalitarian solution ξ, and note that by Lemma 3.2,
it satisfies SIR, PO, IIIA, and CCON. By Lemma A.1 it further satisfies IM. To
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see that it violates SI, consider N := {1, 2} and the problems S := cch{e1, e2}
and T := cch{e1, 2e2}. Then ξ(S) = (1/2, 1/2) 6= (2/3, 2/3) = ξ(T ).
4.4 Individual Monotonicity
Consider the Nash solution, here denoted by ϕN . It is obvious that it satisfies
SIR. Lensberg (1988) showed that it further satisfies PO, SI, IIIA, and CCON.
To see that it violates IM, consider N := {1, 2} and S, T ∈ ΣN with S :=
cch{(1/2, 1), (1, 1/2)} and T := {(1/2, 1), (1, 0)}. Then T ⊆ S and T−2 = S−2,
but ϕN2 (T ) = 1 > 3/4 = ϕ
N
2 (S).
4.5 Conditional Consistency
Consider the solution that for any N ∈ N is equal to Lw ∈ L, with w such that
the lowest-index agent inN has weight |N |, and all others weight 1. Since CCON
is the only axiom that involves problem reduction it follows from Proposition
3.3 that this solution satisfies SIR, PO, SI, IM, and IIIA. To see that it violates
CCON, consider N := {1, 2, 3} and Q := {2, 3}, and problems S ∈ ΣN and
T ∈ ΣQ with S := cch{ei | i ∈ N} and T := myQ(S) where y is the solution
outcome of S. Then y = (3/5, 1/5, 1/5) and T = cch{(2/5, 0), (0, 2/5)}. Note
that u(T ) is proportional to (u(S))Q. However, the solution outcome of T is
(4/15, 2/15) 6= yQ.
4.6 IIA other than the Ideal Point
Whether IIIA is logically independent from the other axioms of Theorem 3.1 is
an open question. Imai (1983, p. 392) described a solution that would satisfy
SIR, PO, SI, IM, and AN, but not IIIA. In particular, this solution would obtain
by updating agents’ utilities in the direction of the utopia point until xk−1 is
reached, and from there on updating utilities of the agents of Qk in the direction
of their global utopia values. While such a solution would indeed violate IIIA,
it would also violate CCON.
In the rest of this section, we provide an alternative characterization of L,
that makes use of slightly weaker axioms than Theorem 3.1. We then demon-
strate that for these weaker axioms, logical independence is unproblematic.
4.6.1 An Alternative Characterization of L
Imai (1983) introduced the following axiom:
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Combined Individual Monotonicity (CIM). For N ∈ N and S, T ∈ ΣN
with T ⊆ S and S−i = T−i for all i ∈ N , ϕ(S) = ϕ(T ).
CIM is directly implied by IM, and its interpretation is analogous: no individual
agent benefits from a contraction of the feasible set, that leaves unaltered the
maximally attainable alternatives of all agents.
We further introduce the following weaker version of CCON.13
Individually Rational CCON (iCCON). If ϕ(S) = 0¯ and S = cch (S ∩
RN+ ), then for all T ∈ ΣQ with T := mϕ(S)Q (S) and u(T ) ∝ (u(S))Q,
ϕ(T ) = (ϕ(S))Q.
Compared to CCON, the premise of iCCON includes the additional requirement
that S = cch (S ∩ RN+ ). Note that Lensberg’s (1988) version of BCON was
only defined for individually rational bargaining problems. Under this domain
restriction, the condition S = cch (S∩RN+ ) – as well as the condition that ϕ(S) =
0¯ – is trivially satisfied.14 In other words, on the domain of individually rational
problems, CCON and iCCON coincide. We obtain the following characterization
result.
Theorem 4.3 ϕ ∈ L iff it satisfies SIR, PO, SI, CIM, IIIA and iCCON.
Proof. Note first that CCON implies iCCON, and that IM implies CIM.
Careful examination of the proof of Proposition 3.4 reveals that the argument
also holds if CIM is imposed, rather than IM. In view of Theorem 3.1, it is
thus sufficient to show that SIR, PO, SI, CIM, IIIA, and iCCON together imply
CCON.
Let ϕ be a solution that satisfies SIR, PO, SI, CIM, IIIA, and iCCON. Let
N ∈ N with |N | = 3 and Q ⊂ N with |Q| = 2, let S ∈ ΣN , and let T ∈ ΣQ
with T := m
ϕ(S)
Q (S) and u(T ) ∝ (u(S))Q. To show is that ϕ(T ) = (ϕ(S))Q. To
this end, define
S′ := cch (S ∩ RN+ ) and T ′ := mϕ(S
′)
Q (S
′).
By SIR and IIIA, ϕ(S′) = ϕ(S) =: y. Using this, we now demonstrate that
T ′ = cch (T ∩ RQ+). Fix some xQ ∈ RQ.
13For all Q,N ∈ N with Q ⊂ N and |Q| = 2, and for all S ∈ ΣN .
14It is not known in general whether Imai’s (1983) lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky so-
lution – and by extension, the weighted generalizations considered in this paper – can be
characterized on this smaller domain.
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1. Suppose xQ ∈ cch (T ∩ RQ+). Then there are zQ ∈ (T ∩ RQ+) such that
zQ = xQ. Then (zQ, yN\Q) = (xQ, yN\Q). Hence, there are z ∈ (S ∩ RN+ )
such that z = (xQ, yN\Q). That is, (xQ, yN\Q) ∈ cch (S ∩ RN+ ) = S′.
2. Suppose (xQ, yN\Q) ∈ S′. Then there are z ∈ (S ∩ RN+ ) such that
(zQ, zN\Q) = (xQ, yN\Q). Take such a z, and construct z′ = (zQ, yN\Q) ∈
(S ∩ RN+ ). By zN\Q = yN\Q and comprehensiveness it follows that z′ =
(xQ, yN\Q). Thus there are zQ ∈ (T ∩ RQ+) such that zQ = xQ. In other
words, xQ ∈ cch (T ∩ RQ+).
Hence, (xQ, yN\Q) ∈ S′ if and only if xQ ∈ cch (T ∩ RQ+). Then
T ′ = {x ∈ RQ | (x, yN\Q) ∈ S′} = cch (T ∩ RQ+).
Since u(T ) = u(T ′), it follows by SIR and IIIA that ϕ(T ) = ϕ(T ′). Furthermore,
it implies u(T ′) ∝ (u(S′))Q, and thus by iCCON, ϕ(T ′) = (ϕ(S′))Q. Since
ϕ(S′) = ϕ(S), this implies ϕ(T ) = (ϕ(S))Q, as desired.
4.6.2 Independence of the Axioms of Theorem 4.3
Since iCCON and CIM are weaker than CCON and IM, the same examples
given above demonstrate that none of the axioms SIR, PO, SI, CIM, or iCCON
is implied by the other axioms of Theorem 4.3. We next show a similar result
for IIIA. To this end, consider the following solution.
Definition. For N ∈ N and i ∈ N , define ui(S) := u(S)ei. For S ∈ ΣN ,
define G(S) := Lw(S), where
wi =
2 if |N | = 2 and S−i = cch{uj(S) | j ∈ N \ i},1 otherwise
for i ∈ N .
Observation 4.4 G does not satisfy IIIA.
Proof. Let N := {1, 2, 3}, and consider S := H(e(N), 3/2) ∩ (e(N) − RN+ )
and T := {x ∈ S | x1 + x2 5 1}. Since there is no i ∈ N such that S−i =
cch {uj(S) | j ∈ N \ i}, G(S) = L(S). Then G(S) ∈ T ⊆ S and u(T ) = u(S),
i.e. the premise of IIIA is satisfied. However, since T−3 = cch {u1(T ), u2(T )},
G(T ) = Lw(T ) with wN = (1, 1, 2). Hence, G(T ) 6= G(S).
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Agent 3
1
1
1
Agent 1
Agent 2
S
b
u(S) = (1, 1, 1)
b
G(S)
Agent 3
1
1
1
Agent 1
Agent 2
T
b
G(S)
G(T )b
Figure 10: G violates IIIA.
Proposition 4.5 G satisfies SIR, PO, SI, CIM and iCCON.
Proof. It is immediate that G satisfies SIR, PO and SI. Let N ∈ N with
|N | = 2 and S ∈ ΣN be given. To see that G satisfies CIM, consider T ∈ ΣN
with T ⊆ S and T−i = S−i for all i ∈ N . To show is that G(S) = G(T ). Since
T−i = S−i for all i ∈ N , the same weights vector w (up to its restriction to N)
is used in S and T . Since Lw satisfies CIM, G(S) = Lw(S) = Lw(T ) = G(T ).
To see that G satisfies iCCON, assume that S = cch (S ∩ RN+ ). If |N | = 2,
then the condition S−i = cch {uj(S) | j ∈ N \ {i}} is trivially satisfied for
both i ∈ N , such that G coincides with L. Suppose |N | > 2, let Q ⊂ N with
|Q| = 2, and consider T ∈ ΣQ with T := myQ(S) and y := G(S). Without loss
of generality, assume Q := {1, 2}. We distinguish between two cases.
• G(S) = Lw(S) where w1 = w2:
Note that Lw satisfies iCCON. Hence, if u(T ) ∝ (u(S))Q, then Lw(T ) =
(Lw(S))Q = yQ. Since w1 = w2, L
w(T ) = L(T ), and thus, since G
coincides with L in two-person problems, Lw(T ) = G(T ). Hence, G(T ) =
yQ.
• G(S) = Lw(S) where w1 6= w2:
Since G satisfies SI, we may assume without loss of generality that u(S) =
e(N). Define γ := 1 −∑k∈N\Q yk. Since y ∈ S it follows by convexity
and comprehensiveness of S that (γ, 0, yN\Q) and (0, γ, yN\Q) are both in
S. This implies ui(T ) = γ for i ∈ Q.
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Assume without loss of generality that w1 = 1 and w2 = 2. The latter
means that S−2 = cch {ej | j ∈ N \ 2}. But then for all (xQ, yN\Q) ∈ S,
x1 5 γ. Hence, u1(T ) = γ.
That w1 = 1 implies cch {ej | j ∈ N \ 1} ⊂ S−1. By convexity of S it
follows that for any v in cch {ej | j ∈ N \ 1}∩RN\1++ there is an  > 0 such
that v + e(N \ 1) ∈ S−1. This implies u2(T ) > γ.
That u2(T ) > u1(T ) implies u(T ) 6∝ e(Q) = (u(S))Q, meaning iCCON is
vacuously satisfied.
Agent 2
Agent 1
1
1
1
b
G(S)
T
u1(T )
u2(T )
Figure 11: If w1 6= w2, the premise of iCCON is violated.
5 Concluding Remarks
The framework in this article assumed an infinite population of agents. All
results continue to hold in a finite-population environment, provided that this
population counts at least three agents. If there are only two agents in the pop-
ulation, then there exist other solutions that satisfy the properties of Theorem
3.1. Dubra (2001) defines such a solution: For N := {1, 2} and S ∈ ΣN ,
F (S) := {x ∈ P (S) | x = (β∗, u2(S)/2)},
where β∗ := max{β | (β, u2(S)/2) ∈ S}.
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We further made the assumption that problems are comprehensive. Other
than making the domain closed under the operation of problem reduction, this
restriction does not play any role in our result. To see this, consider solutions
ϕ defined on the domain that extends Σ to the non-comprehensive problems.
It is easily verified that any such solution, that further satisfies IIIA, yields the
same outcome on a problem S as it does on the convex comprehensive hull of
S.
Finally, since a lexicographic version of the proportional solutions (Kalai,
1977b) would satisfy both BCON and IIA, the characterization of L presented
in this article, can be extended to this solution class. Note that such solutions
would violate SI, a property used in the proofs of Lemma 3.6 and Claim 5;
however, in both instances, SI may be replaced by HOM.
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A Appendix
This Appendix elaborates on several results of Imai (1983). In particular, Sec-
tion A.1 corresponds with Imai’s Lemmas 6 and 7, and part of his Proposition
1 (p. 396–397). Section A.2 is a visual illustration of Imai’s auxiliary problems.
Section A.3 is a modification of Imai’s Lemma 5, and part of his Proposition 2
(p. 396, 398). Section A.4 repeats the final part of that same Proposition 2.
A.1 Solutions ϕ ∈ L satisfy IM
Consider some solution Lw ∈ L with w ∈ RN++. Let N ∈ N , and let S and T be
problems in ΣN with T ⊆ S and T−i = S−i for some i ∈ N . Since Lw satisfies
SI, we may assume without loss of generality that u(S) = w−1N , where wN is the
restriction of w to the agents in N . Then
Lw(S) = ξ(S). (5)
Define u := u(S)u(T )−1, and observe that
Lw(T ) = u−1ξ(uT ). (6)
By Equations (5) and (6) it is sufficient to show that ξi(S) = 1ui ξi(uT ). This is
done in two steps. First it is established that ξi(S) = ξi(T ), and subsequently,
that ξi(T ) = 1ui ξi(uT ).
Lemma A.1 Let y ∈ T with i ∈ Q(T, y). Then Q(T, y) = Q(S, y).
Proof. Suppose there is some i′ ∈ Q(S, y) \Q(T, y). Define x := x(S, y) and
x′ := x(T, y). Since S−i = T−i and x ∈ S, there is a z ∈ T such that zj = xj
for all j ∈ N \ {i}. By convexity of T it follows that λx′ + (1− λ)z ∈ T for all
λ ∈ [0, 1]. We have x, x′ = y, zj = xj for all j ∈ N \ {i}, and x′i > yi (since
i ∈ Q(T, y)). Hence, there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that z∗ := λx′ + (1− λ)z = y
and z∗ ∈ T . Since i′ ∈ Q(S, y) \Q(T, y), xi′ > yi′ = x′i′ . Then z∗i′ = λx′i′ + (1−
λ)xi′ > yi′ . This implies i
′ ∈ Q(T, y), a contradiction.
In essence, as long as the i-th coordinate can be further increased in problem
T , it can be further increased in S as well. It follows that ξi(S) = ξi(T ).
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To show that ξi(T ) = 1ui ξi(uT ), define the following:
x := ξ(T ) y := uξ(T )
x′ := u−1ξ(uT ) y′ := ξ(uT )
The aim is to show that xi = x′i.
Observation A.2 x N x′ and y′ N y (or x = x′ and y = y′).
Proof. Observe that ξ(T ) ∈ T , implying uξ(T ) ∈ uT . Since ξ(uT ) N z for
all z ∈ uT with z 6= ξ(uT ), ξ(uT ) N uξ(T ) (or ξ(uT ) = uξ(T )). In other
words, y′ N y (or y′ = y). Similarly, observe that ξ(uT ) ∈ uT , and thus
u−1ξ(uT ) ∈ T . Since ξ(T ) N z for all z ∈ T with z 6= ξ(T ), this implies
ξ(T ) N u−1ξ(uT ) (or ξ(T ) = u−1ξ(uT )). In other words, x N x′ (or x = x′).
Since x = x′ if and only if y = y′, the observation follows.
Lemma A.3 xi = x′i.
Proof. Clearly, if x = x′ and y = y′, then the inequality holds trivially, and
we are done. Hence, assume x N x′ and y′ N y. Since y′ N y, there is an
index m 5 |N | such that the first m − 1 elements of µ(y) and µ(y′) are equal,
and µm(y
′) > µm(y). Assume first that x′i = µm(y′). Since x′ and y′ only differ
in the i-th coordinate, x′i = µm(y′) implies that the first m elements of µ(x′)
and µ(y′) coincide. Then the first m−1 elements of µ(x′) coincide with the first
m− 1 elements of µ(y). Observe that x and y only differ in the i-th coordinate
and yi > xi, so there are two possibilities:
1. there is some k 5 m − 1 such that the first k − 1 elements of µ(y) and
µ(x) coincide, and µk(y) > µk(x). Then the first k − 1 elements of µ(x′)
and µ(x) coincide and µk(x
′) > µk(x). Then x′ N x, a contradiction.
2. the first m elements of µ(y) and µ(x) coincide. Since the first m − 1
elements of µ(x′) and µ(y) coincide, this implies that the first m − 1
elements of µ(x) and µ(x′) coincide. However, the m-th element of µ(x′)
coincides with the m-th element of µ(y′). Since µm(y′) > µm(y) this
implies µm(x
′) > µm(y). Since µm(x) = µm(y) this implies µm(x′) >
µm(x), and thus x
′ N x. This is a contradiction.
It follows from the above that x′i < µm(y
′). Hence, x′i = µm′(x
′) for some
m′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, and take the lowest m′ in case of ties. Similarly, xi = µk(x)
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for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and take the highest possible k in case of ties. There
are two possibilities: k = m′ or k < m′.
1. If k < m′, then µk(x′) = µk(y′) (they only differ in the i-th coordinate;
since µm′(x
′) = xi, k < m′ implies that µk′(x′) = µk′(y′) for all k′ =
1, . . . , k). Since the first m − 1 elements of µ(y) and µ(y′) coincide, and
k < m′ 5 m − 1, the first k elements of µ(y) and µ(y′) coincide. Since
x and y only differ in the i-th coordinate and xi = µk(x), the first k − 1
elements of µ(x) and µ(y) coincide. This in turn implies that the first
k− 1 elements of µ(x) and µ(x′) coincide. Since yi > xi and by the choice
of k (it was chosen such that µk+1(x) > µk(x)), µk(y) > µk(x). Since the
first k elements of µ(y) coincide with the first k elements of µ(x′), this
implies µk(x
′) > µk(x). Hence, x′ N x, a contradiction.
2. Let k = m′. Observe that the first m′ − 1 elements of µ(x′) and µ(y′)
coincide (this is so because they only differ in the i-th coordinate and
µm′(x
′) = x′i). From before, we know that the first m−1 elements of µ(y)
and µ(y′) coincide, which implies that their first m′ elements coincide
as well. Hence, the first m′ − 1 elements of µ(x′) coincide with the first
m′−1 elements of µ(y). Since x and y only differ in the i-th coordinate and
xi = µk(x), the firstm
′ elements of µ(x) coincide with the firstm′ elements
of µ(y). Hence, the first m′ − 1 elements of µ(x) and µ(x′) coincide. If
µm′(x
′) > µm′(x), then x′ N x, and we obtain a contradiction. Hence,
µm′(x
′) 5 µm′(x). But then x′i = µm′(x′) 5 µm′(x) 5 µk(x) = xi, as
desired.
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A.2 The Auxiliary Problems of Proposition 3.4
This section presents a worked out example of the auxiliary problems used in the
proof of Proposition 3.4, for some weights vector w. Suppose that the problem
and the solution outcome of a problem S are as in Figure 12. Then Lw(S) is
reached in two iterations, i.e., Lw(S) = x2.
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
S
b
b
x1
x2
Figure 12: The problem S and the solution outcome Lw(S) = x2.
Recall that S0 = H(e(N), 1). This problem is depicted in Figure 13(a). From
S0 one can construct the problem S
1
: it is given by H(e(N), α1)∩ (e(N)−RN+ ).
Thus, the half-space that determines S0 slides upwards, and is intersected by a
set that limits utilities to 1.
x0
S0
b
(a) The problem S0
S1
b
x1
(b) The problem S
1
Figure 13: The problems S0 and S
1
.
The problem S1 is the intersection of S with the half-space H(e(N), α1). Simi-
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larly, S′1 is the intersection of the problem S and the problem S
1
, depicted in
Figure 13(b). Note that these two problems coincide. For the first iteration this
is always the case.
S1
b
x1
(a) The problem S1
S ′1
b
x1
(b) The problem S′1
Figure 14: The problems S1 and S′1.
To determine the auxiliary problems for the second iteration, one must deter-
mine S1. It is equal to S
1
, intersected by H(p2, p2 ·x2), a half-space that leaves
the utilities of agent 3 free, but restricts those of agents 1 and 2 in a {1, 2}-
symmetric fashion. The problem S
2
is given by H(e(N), α2), intersected by
that same half-space H(p2, p2 · x2), and the set (e(N) − RN+ ) that limits the
utilities of all agents to 1.
S1
b
x1
H(p2, p2 · x2)
(a) The problem S1
S2 H(p
2, p2 · x2)
b
b
x1
x2
(b) The problem S
2
Figure 15: The problems S1 and S
2
.
The problem S′2 is the intersection of S
2
, as depicted in Figure 15(b), and the
original problem S. The end result is depicted in Figure 16(a). The problem
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S2 is given by the intersection of the original problem S and the half-space
H(e(N), α2).
S ′2
b
b
x1
x2
(a) The problem S′2
S2
b
b
x1
x2
(b) The problem S2
Figure 16: The problems S′2 and S2.
A.3 Proof of Claim 1
In order to show that u(S
j
) = u(Sj) = u(Sj) = u(S′j) = e(N) for all j =
1, . . . , k, it is sufficient to show that ei is in S
j
, Sj , Sj and S′j for each j and i.
This follows from four observations.
(a) ei ∈ H(pj , pj · xj) for each i and j;
(b) ei ∈ H(e(N), αj) for each i and j;
(c) ei ∈ S for all i;
(d) ei ∈ (e(N)− RN+ ) for all i.
Note that (a), (b) and (d) together imply ei ∈ Sj for each i and j. Then by (c),
ei ∈ S′j for each i and j; for j < k, it is implied by (a) that each ei is in Sj .
Finally, (b) and (c) together imply ei ∈ Sj for each i and j.
Observation (d) is trivial. Observation (c) follows from comprehensiveness
of S and the assumption that u(S) = e(N). We now show (a) and (b). Denote
N \Q2 by Q, Q2 by Q′, and for i ∈ Q, denote Q′ ∪{i} by Qi. Let w¯ := (w¯i)i∈N
where w¯i := wi/
∑
i′∈Q wi′ for all i ∈ N . Note that
∑
i∈Q w¯i = 1.
By the supporting hyperplane theorem and the definition of x1, there is a
p ∈ RN+ with pi = 0 for all i ∈ Q′, such that p · z 5 p · x1 for all z ∈ S. By
40
observation (c), p·ei 5 p·x1 for all i ∈ Q. Since pi = 0 for all i ∈ Q′, this implies
p · e(Qi) = p · ei 5 p · x1 for all i ∈ Q. It follows that p ·
∑
i∈Q w¯ie(Qi) 5 p · x1.
Note that
∑
i∈Q w¯ie(Qi) = w¯+ (e(Q
′)− w¯e(Q′)). Since pi = 0 for all i ∈ Q′, we
obtain p · w¯ 5 p ·x1. Note that x1 = α1wN = [α1
∑
i∈Q wi]w¯. Then p · w¯ 5 p ·x1
is equivalent to α1
∑
i∈Q wi = 1. Hence, x1 = α1wN = wN∑
i∈Q wi
= w¯.
Since p1 · ei = 0 for all i ∈ N , each ei is trivially in H(p1, p1 · x1). Consider
some j ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Note that pji = 0 for all i ∈ Qj . Hence,
pj · w¯ =
∑
i∈N\Qj
w¯i =
∑
i∈N\Qj wi∑
i∈N\Q2 wi
=
∑
i∈N\Q2 wi∑
i∈N\Q2 wi
= 1.
The inequality follows from the observation that N \Q2 is a subset of N \Qj .
By the above, xj = x1 = w¯. Hence, pj ·xj = pj ·x1 = pj · w¯ = 1. Since pj ·ei 5 1
for all i ∈ N , we obtain pj ·xj = pj ·ei for all i ∈ N . This establishes observation
(a).
Since x1 = w¯ and
∑
i∈N w¯i =
∑
i∈Q w¯i = 1, e(N) · ei = 1 5 e(N) · w¯ 5
e(N) · x1 = α1 for all i ∈ N . Hence, ei ∈ H(e(N), α1) for all i ∈ N . Since
H(e(N), α1) ⊂ H(e(N), αj) for each 1 < j 5 k, observation (b) follows.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4 (Continued)
The proof of Proposition 3.4 is concluded by the following three claims.
Claim 7 ϕ(S
1
) = ϕ(S1) = ϕ(S1) = ϕ(S′1) = x1.
Proof. Since ϕ(S0) = x0, ϕ(S
1
) = x1 by Claim 6. Since x1 ∈ S1 and x1 ∈ S,
x1 ∈ S′1. Then x1 = ϕ(S1) ∈ S′1 ⊆ S1, and by Claim 1, u(S′1) = u(S1).
Thus by IIIA, ϕ(S′1) = ϕ(S
1
) = x1. For all i ∈ N \ Q2, x1i = x2i , implying
p2 · x1 = p2 · x2. Hence, x1 ∈ H(p2, p2 · x2). Then x1 = ϕ(S1) ∈ S1 ⊆ S1;
by Claim 1, u(S1) = u(S
1
). Then by IIIA, ϕ(S1) = ϕ(S
1
) = x1. To see
that ϕ(S1) = x1, observe first that S′1 = S1 ∩ (e(N) − RN+ ). Since ϕ(S1) 5
u(S1) = e(N), ϕ(S1) ∈ (e(N) − RN+ ). Hence, ϕ(S1) ∈ S′1 ⊆ S1, and by Claim
1, u(S′1) = u(S1). Thus, ϕ(S1) = ϕ(S′1) = x1 by IIIA.
Claim 8 ϕ(S
j
) = ϕ(Sj) = ϕ(Sj) = ϕ(S′j) = xj for each j = 1, . . . , k (or
j = 1, . . . , k − 1 for ϕ(Sj)).
Proof. Consider j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, and assume ϕ(Sj−1) = ϕ(Sj−1) = ϕ(Sj−1) =
ϕ(S′j−1) = xj−1. By Claim 6, ϕ(S
j
) = xj . Then ϕ(S′j) = xj follows as in Claim
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7. Furthermore, if j < k, then also ϕ(Sj) = xj follows as in Claim 7. What is
left to show is that ϕ(Sj) = xj . To this end, it is first argued that ϕ(Sj) is an
element of S
j
.
1. Since Sj ⊆ H(e(N), αj), ϕ(Sj) ∈ H(e(N), αj).
2. Since ϕ(Sj) 5 u(Sj) = e(N), ϕ(Sj) ∈ (e(N)− RN+ ).
3. By part ii) of Lemma 3.5, Sj−1−i = S
j
−i for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, Sj−1 ⊆
Sj . Thus by an |N |-fold application of IM, ϕ(Sj) = ϕ(Sj−1) = xj−1.
As in Claim 3, this implies ϕi(S
j) = xji for all i ∈ N \ Qj . From this
it follows that for all j′ ∈ {1, . . . , j}, ϕ(Sj) ∈ H(pj′ , pj′ · xj′). Thus,
ϕ(Sj) ∈ ⋂jj′=1H(pj′ , pj′ · xj′).
It follows that ϕ(Sj) ∈ Sj . Since Sj ⊆ S, we further have ϕ(Sj) ∈ S. Thus,
ϕ(Sj) ∈ S′j ⊆ Sj , and by Claim 1, u(Sj) = u(S′j). Then by IIIA, ϕ(Sj) =
ϕ(S′j) = xj .
Claim 9 ϕ(S) = xk.
Proof. Since Sk = S ∩H(e(N), αk), ϕ(S) = ϕ(Sk) by an |N |-fold application
of IM and part ii) of Lemma 3.5. Then by Claim 8, ϕ(S) = xk. The claim
follows from the observation that xk ∈ P (S).
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